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ABSTRACT
The field of Law and Literature, perhaps more than any other
area of legal studies, has been touched deeply by Robert Cover’s life
and work.1 My interactions with Bob over the last half dozen years of
*

Richard H. Weisberg, Distinguished Visiting Professor, University of Pittsburgh
Law School and Floersheimer Chair Emeritus, Cardozo Law School. I would like to
acknowledge the excellent assistance of the Touro Law Review editors and the
hospitality of the faculty and the editors in welcoming my wife and myself in person
to this symposium.
1
Approaches taken by others at this Conference were not to the contrary. Professor
Chin reported that a google search linking “Robert Cover” and “Law and Literature”
yields many more hits than does any other scholarly connection to his work; and
Professor Scharff’s attempt to implicate Bob in “the death of Law and Literature”
was first narrowed by him at the Conference to the “Law as Literature”–the move to
interpretation within the discipline–and then further restricted to Bob’s uneasiness
with theories that insufficiently grasp the potential real-world consequences of
judicial language. References in this paper to “Law and Literature” solely involve
what otherwise might schematically be called “Law in Literature,” namely stories
about law. The schematic division of the field is usually attributed to Robert
Weisberg (no relation). See, e.g., Robert Weisberg, The Law-Literature Enterprise,
1 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1 (1989). Further and briefly at the outset, Robert Cover’s
skepticism about the “Law as Literature” never implicated even that whole subdiscipline, as he clearly linked himself familialy to the whole field. See infra
Appendix, Illustration 5, for the first few paragraphs of his last, posthumously
published article. He would have very much admired, I think, KENT GREENAWALT,
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his tragically short life provide an insight, recounted in a somewhat
personal vein here, into his profound engagement with stories, with the
most enduring part of that revitalized inter-discipline. I specify and
illustrate five conversations I had with him during conferences, family
interactions, or long New Haven walks beginning in 1981 and ending
the day before his untimely death in the Summer of 1986. On each
occasion, Bob wanted to spin out ideas we were developing together
about Dostoevsky’s last masterpiece, The Brothers Karamazov (“The
Brothers”), and in these pages, I want to engage the largest issues
provoked in Bob’s mind by that text: law, religion, and the potential
undermining of sound traditions through “revolutionary” interpretive
distortions.2
Why, I ruminate here, did Bob delve repetitively into the pages
of the text he always spoke of affectionately as “The Brothers?” I
provide something of an answer in putting part of that novel together
with part of the transcript of the recent trial of Derek Chauvin for the
murder of George Floyd3—with occasional brief allusions to the O.J.
Simpson trial of 1988. The focus is on the behavior of defense counsel,
fictional and real; might the wild manipulation of reality introduced by
The Brothers brilliant lawyer, Fetyukovich, have motivated Bob to
crystallize misgivings about our system’s epistemological shakiness
more generally? Is there a better way to resolve disputes, perhaps, or—
LEGAL INTERPRETATION: PERSPECTIVES FROM OTHER DISCIPLINES AND PRIVATE
TEXTS (2010). He consistently stressed his refusal to see Law as one of the Liberal
Arts generally, especially because of what he saw as the former’s potential for
interpretive violence. Again though, we must be careful: when Bob writes of
interpretive violence, he is discussing not all judicial words or actions, but only those
that lead, as so often happens in stories about law, to error. For further discussion
of this issue, see infra text accompanying note 18, suggesting that Cover may well
have been uncharacteristically mistaken in failing to see the horrific possibilities for
“violence” in some literary texts and how they are interpreted!
2
FYODOR DOSTOEVSKY, THE BROTHERS KARAMAZOV (David McDuff trans.,
Penguin Books 2003) (1880). Although Cover wrote in some influential detail about
many other stories, to my knowledge there was just one sentence about The Brothers.
See ROBERT COVER, Nomos and Narrative, in NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE
LAW: THE ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER 95, 118 n.66 (Martha Minow et al. eds.,1992),
which is about “The Grand Inquisitor” chapter of Dostoevsky’s novel. Yet that one
sentence, and the paragraphs around it, id., announce a full program for nomos that
Bob, I believe, found in the pages of this great novel. See infra Part III.
3
See Defense Closing Argument Transcript: Derek Chauvin Trial for Murder of
George Floyd, REV (Apr. 19, 2021), https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/defenseclosing-argument-transcript-derek-chauvin-trial-for-murder-of-george-floyd
[hereinafter Chauvin Def. Closing Argument].
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put differently—to find the pathway to legal accuracy and soundness
that Bob insisted on during those long conversations, and during his
lifetime generally? Do his favorite stories, including those he wrote
about influentially, Billy Budd, Sailor4 and The Antigone,5 indicate that
fictional novels, as ironic as it seems, almost uniquely provide a
pathway to truthful outcomes, stories read and re-read, argued about,
and integrated into a community that elevated them, Midrashically,
into the status of law?6
Bob’s taste in stories was highly selective, and it constantly
invited him and his students to the table of Tanakh, Gemorrha, 5th
Century Greek Tragedy, Melville, and the Russians. He made me an
occasional guest at that table. At a 1981 Brandeis conference on
“Terror in the Modern Age: The Vision of Literature, the Response of
Law,”7 I first learned of his fascination with The Brothers. Illustration
1 is a photo taken at that conference 8 where Bob and I are discussing,
as I recall the moment, the defendant Dmitri Karamazov’s terror at
finding himself on trial for the murder of his father, a parricide that the
reader of the novel already knows should be laid at the hands of his
brother Ivan and his half-brother Smerdyakov, who are not in the dock.
At that stage in our relationship, Bob knew that I was developing a
manuscript about fiction writers’ self-awareness when depicting in
great detail lawyers, investigations, and trials, and the horror often felt
by ordinary people in the face of error-prone narrative power.

4

See ROBERT COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED 1-7 (1975) (discussing HERMAN MELVILLE,
Billy Budd, Sailor, in MELVILLE’S SHORT NOVELS (Dan McCall ed., Norton, 2002)
(1924)).
5
Id. (discussing SOPHOCLES, ANTIGONE (David Grene et al. eds., Elizabeth Wyckoff
trans., Univ. Chicago Press 1954) (441 B.C.)).
6
The most complex sentences, and the most significant, penned by Bob in Nomos
and Narrative have to do with the stories that undergird Jewish Law. I am convinced
also from our conversations that he was trying to explain to all audiences the special
relationship of nomos to narrative in the Jewish tradition. As one who had some
parallel religious experiences and that specific challenge, I understood his struggle
to articulate to non-Jews, and even to many secular Jews, this unique embodiment of
his foremost essay’s title. He also connected this struggle, I believe, to his
engagement with The Brothers. For more on this, see infra Part III.
7
See Symposium: Terror in the Modern Age: The Vision of Literature, the Response
of Law, 5 HUM. RTS. Q. 109 (1983) [hereinafter Symposium].
8
See infra Appendix, Illustration 1, for an image from the Brandeis Conference. See
also Symposium, supra note 7.
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Illustration 29 is a contemporaneous calendar marking for 1982 of the
Cover family joining with mine at the beach in Guilford, Connecticut,
where our conversations continued at low tide, feet in the Long Island
Sound and tossing around a ball. Earlier that year, Bob had
participated in what became a well-known Association of American
Law Schools (“A.A.L.S.”) session on Legal Interpretation that I had
convened, which included Owen Fiss and Stanley Fish. At this
conference, and elsewhere Bob signaled his lack of interest in the
“turn” to interpretation—sometimes called Law as Literature.10 He
and I never revisited, in private conversation, that component of the
field of Law and Literature. 11 The very next year, my calendar
memorializes (Illustration 3) a crucial day for me in New Haven,
when—typifying Bob’s generosity to fellow scholars and his spiritual
yearning for stories—he led me over to the office of Ellen Graham, the
formidable literary editor of the Yale University Press.12 He was
bringing to her my manuscript with the working title The Failure of
the Word. Anciently, this was done in a cardboard box bearing pages
of corrasable bond typing paper. Bob had read the manuscript,
including significant chapters on Billy Budd, Sailor and The Brothers,
and he wanted the Press to publish it, which (after peer review by law
professors and Russian Literature scholars, among others) it was
published.13 From his office to Ms. Graham’s, we centered our
thoughts on The Brothers.
9

See infra Appendix, Illustration 2, for images of the first of several illustrations
taken from my personal calendars for the years 1982, 1983, and 1986. See also
Symposium, supra note 7.
10
Audio tape: Section on Law and the Humanities, held by the Association of
American Law Schools (Jan. 1, 1973). A recording of this session, which has
become somewhat famous, is available with the author.
11
See infra text accompanying note 18.
12
See infra Appendix, Illustration 3, for images of my 1983 calendar notation for the
meeting first in Bob’s office and then in Ellen Graham’s.
13
See generally RICHARD H. WEISBERG, THE FAILURE OF THE WORD: THE
PROTAGONIST AS LAWYER IN MODERN FICTION (1984) [hereinafter THE FAILURE OF
THE WORD]. The argument of that book had been foreshadowed in several law
review articles: Richard Weisberg, How Judges Speak: Some Lessons on
Adjudication in Billy Budd, Sailor, with an Application to Justice Rehnquist, 57
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1982), and Richard Weisberg, Comparative Law in Comparative
Literature: The Figure of the “Examining Magistrate” in Dostoevski and Camus, 29
RUTGERS L. REV. 237 (1976). In the latter piece, I point out salient differences
between our adversarial approach and the inquisitorial one on the continent, but when
it comes to the closing arguments analyzed here there is little relevant distinction
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LEGAL ERROR IN “THE BROTHERS”: FROM PROSECUTION
TO DEFENSE, AND A PROGRESSION IN BOB’S THINKING

In our conversations, Bob had largely accepted The Failure of
the Word’s idea about prosecutorial error in Billy Budd, Sailor and The
Brothers.14 In both, much of the story centers on a trial scene; but in
Dostoevsky’s law-saturated story, fully one-quarter of the immense
novel delves in detail into the preliminary investigation as well as the
ensuing trial of Dmitri. 15 Little by little, error emerges in the
prosecution’s detailed ratiocination of the crime. First emphasized by
W. Wolfgang Holdheim, one of my dissertation advisers at Cornell,
such legal error occurs notably in dominant fictional narratives such as
this one.16 The error occurs, but there is a difference between tracking
mistakes to a series of deliberate, malevolent, or grossly negligent
prosecutorial manipulations and (as Bob never did!) positing some
indeterminacy in law that inevitably brings them about. Bob sincerely
believed in law—undergirded by sound narrative traditions 17—as a
pathway to justice. The stories he loved indicate what that pathway is
and how human manipulators of law willfully or negligently lose sight
of it, leaving innocent people to suffer and the guilty to remain free. 18
between the two systems. In the former, I noted the unique jurisprudential force of
Law and Literature for understanding judicial decision-making, and as to that
analytical strand, including a superb reading of The Brothers, see Daniel J. Solove,
Postures of Judging: An Exploration of Judicial Decision Making, 9 CARDOZO STUD.
L. & LITERATURE 173 (1997), especially, id. at 183-207.
14
Prominent reviews of the book had begun to appear, some highly supportive of its
textual analysis and others skeptical. See A.W.B. Simpson, Disagreeable Rhetoric,
4278 TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT 342, 342 (1985) (book review); Richard A.
Posner, From Billy Budd to Buchenwald, 96 YALE L.J. 1173, 1173 (1987) (book
review).
15
See DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 2.
16
W. WOLFGANG HOLDHEIM, DER JUSTIZIRRTUM ALS LITERARISCHE PROBLEMATIK
(Walter de Gruyter ed., 1969). For superb translations of salient sections of
Holdheim’s work, see Marguerite DeHuszar Allen, The Mediator, 3 L. & HUM. INST.
3 (Dec. 1983). For a photo of Holdheim around the time of publication, see infra
Appendix, Illustration 7. See also W. Wolfgang Holdheim, Judicial Error as a
Literary Theme (1969): “Defining the Theme”, 7 CARDOZO STUD. L. & LITERATURE
117 (1995); see infra text accompanying notes 41-43.
17
See generally COVER, supra note 2.
18
As to the guilty, Bob could be as concerned with legal error in their cases as he
was with mistreatments of the innocent. The polestar indication of this is Bob’s
support for capital punishment in appropriate cases, a position that puzzled many of
his acolytes. At this conference, I was among the few to bring this feature up, citing
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I think now that the prosecutorial error part of things was, for
all its importance, the tip of the iceberg for Bob. Even (or perhaps
especially?) after The Failure of the Word was published, he wanted
to continue to delve into The Brothers. I was fortunate to engage him
in that venture upon two occasions in the year his life tragically ended.
One was on Sapelo Island, off the coast of Georgia, the postconference venue for participants from the Law and Literature
conference in Athens organized by Milner Ball. 19 And the last was on
a long walk (part walk/part bicycle) in New Haven on what turned out
to be the last full day of his life (memorialized in three contemporary
notations from my calendar from July 17th to July 20th of 1986).20
Towards the end, Bob had started to ponder the slipperiness of
adversarial rhetoric notable on the defense side in The Brothers. My
imagination, as we spoke, saw him earmarking the entire final seventy
pages (“A Judicial Error”) of the novel and especially the long closing
argument of Dmitri’s lawyer, Fetyukovich. 21 That rising star in a
rejuvenated Russian Tsarist-era legal profession22 had come from St.
one of Bob’s most provocative thoughts: “Law’s expressive range is profound, and
as with other resources of language, the relation of law’s manifest content to its
meaning is often complicated. Consider the question of using capital punishment to
express the dignity of human life and its ultimate worth.” Id. at 100 n.22 (italics in
original).
19
See infra Appendix, Illustration 5, for the first, highly relevant paragraph of his
article for the proceedings of that conference, published posthumously. There, Bob
allies himself with his “brothers[!]” in the field of Law and Literature and draws the
line both at conceding that Law is indeed one of the humanities and that legal and
literary words are equally capable of producing “violence.” He was elsewhere
explicitly skeptical of James Boyd White, who “has raised rhetoric to the pinnacle of
jurisprudence.” See ROBERT COVER, Violence and the Word, in COVER, supra note
2, at 204 n.2. I disagreed with him, but not programmatically, on all these points,
see supra note 1 and accompanying text, and infra note 32, but these differences
were a sideshow to our agreement on the vitality and significance for law of stories.
On the beach at Sapelo, where we both had our sons with us playing touch football,
Bob showed me (again) not only that he was a terrific athlete (he had swum about 50
laps in UGA’s Olympic sized pool prior to the conference, compared to my 20, and
he was a superb drop kicker on the improvised seaside football “field”) but also that
his thirst for knowledge about The Brothers remained strong.
20
See infra Appendix, Illustration 5, which includes the New Haven walk; Bob’s
shocking death one day later; Guido’s tearful call to me the night after; and Bob’s
funeral.
21
DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 2, at 838-960.
22
See generally THE FAILURE OF THE WORD, supra note 13, for details about the
liberal reforms of the profession in Alexandrine Russia as Dostoevsky was writing
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Petersburg to the provinces to defend the alleged parricide, the eldest
Karamazov son, bringing with him not only a bag of legal tricks but a
nihilistic approach to truth. 23 Having listened to the prosecutor’s
theory of the case, which rehearses erroneously the night of the murder
and the motives of the defendant, Fetyukovich had several choices: (1)
tear apart the case as false; (2) try to re-direct attention from central
realities within it to peripheral details; or (3) deny the existence of
facts, realities, and the idea of truth altogether. 24 Before a jury of
ordinary provincial Russians, he chooses all three, but as his argument
proceeds, he trends more and more toward the third option, a form of
nihilism.25 In doing so, he needlessly loses the case for his client, and
he discombobulates the very idea of justice so precious to Bob.
The chapter headings show this undoubtedly misguided (given
the jury) rhetorical progression: Book XII, Chapter 10 (“The Defense
Counsel’s Speech: A Stick with Two Ends”);26 Chapter 11 (“There was
No Money. There was No Robbery”);27 Chapter 12 (“Nor was There
Even Any Murder”);28 Chapter 13 (“An Adulterer of Thought”). 29 In
Chapter 14 (“The Muzhiks Stand Up for Themselves”), the jury easily
restores common sense to the scene—until we remember that their
verdict is simply erroneous! 30 They reject the interloper’s interpretive
and philosophical strategies and find Dmitri guilty after only one hour
of deliberation.31
The defendant’s final words to the jury prior to their
deliberation also reject his counsel’s approach while still stabilizing
the reader, who knows from the long description of the crime earlier in
the text that Smerdyakov and Ivan are the guilty parties: “I thank the
public procurator,32 much has he told me of myself that I did not know,
Crime and Punishment in 1866–reforms that the novelist closely studied over the
years leading up to The Brothers.
23
DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 2.
24
Id.
25
Id.; see infra Part III, for a provocatively similar approach taken by defense
counsel, Eric Nelson, in the Chauvin closing argument.
26
DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 2, at 924.
27
Id. at 929.
28
Id. at 936.
29
Id. at 945.
30
Id. at 945.
31
Id. at 959.
32
David McDuff’s fine translation of The Brothers Karamazov, DOSTOEVSKY, supra
note 2, wisely accepted a suggestion I made in The Failure of the Word that the
differences between continental and English-American criminal procedure be
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but it is not true that I killed my father, the public procurator is
mistaken!”33
The Brothers leads most of its readers to wonder whether
justice can be done on this earth. Indeed, its most famous passage, the
parable “The Grand Inquisitor,” a text devised—as he also devises his
father’s murder—by Ivan Karamazov, similarly asks how truth can be
found in a Christian world that Christ himself has abandoned to his
priests and lawyers.34 Bob was drawn to the question but reached the
conclusion that justice was available if a different set of ethical
principles (nomoi) and a contrary narrative—Jewish rather than
Christian—could be adopted.35 But in looking at the representation of
a secular criminal procedure in The Brothers, he saw the pitfalls of a
system in which defense counsel, as much as—and sometimes more
than—prosecutors, are all too prone to distort the truth or to miss it
altogether. Although he did not live to experience O.J. or Chauvin, he
might have been fascinated to see the closeness of argumentation in
two paradigms: The Brothers’ Fetyukovich failing to see his client’s
innocence and thus arguing for it but “for the wrong reasons;” and in
the Chauvin and O.J. trials, the defense counsel throwing everything
at the juries on behalf of clients generally known to be guilty. Such a
system, such a discourse, needs fundamental rehabilitation.
II.

JUXTAPOSING FETYUKOVICH AND ERIC NELSON (AND THE
O.J. “DREAM TEAM?”)
A.

Defense Counsel’s Grotesque Advice to Juries on
How to Think

Eric Nelson is the reigning Fetyukovich of the 21st century.36
His representation of Derek Chauvin for the murder of George Floyd
culminated on April 19, 2021 with a lengthy closing argument to the

signaled wherever possible, and the term “prokurator” instead of “prosecutor”
signals those differences to the English-language reader. FAILURE OF THE WORD,
supra note 13, at 46.
33
DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 2, at 956.
34
Id. at 322-45.
35
See Richard Weisberg, Binaries: Remarks on Chaim N. Saimon’s “Halakhah”, 64
VILL. L. REV. 787, 790-92 (2019); see also infra text accompanying note 64.
36
See infra Appendix, Illustration 6, for a picture of Nelson with his client, Derek
Chauvin.
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jury.37 While Fetyukovich’s unsuccessful closing arguments are in
stark contrast to the late 20th century’s similar yet “successful”
arguments in the O.J. Simpson trial, Chauvin’s trial exemplifies the
role played deliberately by some defense counsel to confuse the jury
as well as the strikingly similar pathway to misleading the jury that
Robert Cover found so troubling in the lengthy fictional account
offered by The Brothers. The following three sections discuss the three
salient factors told to the jury that link stories to law—narrative to
nomos—in this key area of legal (mis)communication.
B.

Ignore Specific Facts: Look Instead Elsewhere,
Thus Minimizing the Obvious Enormity by
“Contextualizing” the Crime

Fetyukovich, faced with a client whom he (wrongly!) believes
to be guilty, needs to reckon with Dmitri’s having been seen by the old
man’s servant running wildly from the murder scene, striking that
servant, and then going on a spending spree right after the murder in
which he, the alleged parricide, spends 3,000 rubles allegedly taken
from his father’s bedside.38 In fact, every inference of Dmitri’s being
the parricide within this scenario is incorrect. But Fetyukovich and his
21st century mirror image, Nelson, play the same game: try to confuse
the jury by dissipating the central reality of the crime and absorbing it
into some equally fake larger whole. With considerable relevance to
legal readers in a Trump and post-Trump political world, the fictional
defense counsel says to the jury, early in his remarks: “[I]t is in order
to smash this terrible weight of the facts . . . that I have taken it upon
myself to defend this case.”39
In Book XII, Chapter 12, Fetyukovich says:
For the very reason that the corpse of the murdered
father was found, that a witness saw the defendant in
the garden, armed and running away, and was himself
cast down by him, and consequently it was all
performed the way it was written [in a letter produced
late in the trial by Dmitri’s spurned and resentful lover,

37

Chauvin Def. Closing Argument, supra note 3.
DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 2, at 509, 517-18.
39
Id. at 926.
38
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Katerina Ivanovna]40 and so the letter is not ridiculous,
but fateful. Thanks be to God, we have arrived at the
point of our endeavor: “If he was in the garden, that
means he was the murderer.” The whole thing, the
entire case for the prosecution may be reduced to those
two expressions: if he was, followed inevitably by that
means. But what if there is no that means even though
he was? Oh, I recognize that the weight of the facts, the
concurrence of the facts are indeed rather eloquent. I
should like you, however, to examine each of these
facts separately, without being hypnotized by their
combined weight . . . .41
In the closing argument for the defense in the George Floyd
trial, Eric Nelson stated:
It’s not the proper analysis because the 9 minutes and
29 seconds [during which Chauvin’s body weight and
knee press down on Floyd’s neck] ignores the previous
16 minutes and 59 seconds. It completely disregards it.
It says, “[i]n that moment, at that point, nothing else
that happened before should be taken into consideration
by a reasonable police officer.” It tries to reframe the
issue of what a reasonable police officer would do. A
reasonable police officer would in fact take into
consideration the previous 16 minutes and 59 seconds.
Their experience with the subject, the struggle that they
had, the comparison of the words to actions, it all comes
into play, why? Because human behavior is
unpredictable. Human behavior is unpredictable, and
nobody knows it better than a police officer. Someone
can be compliant one second and fighting the next.
Every character whose name has “Ivan” in it suffers from the vengeful spitefulness
of a condition called Ressentiment (Russian: zlost’), which is a pervasive condition
not only in The Brothers Karamazov, but in the modern novel more generally. See
THE FAILURE OF THE WORD, supra note 13, passim. In The Brothers Karamazov,
these “Ivans” include Katatrina “Ivan”ova, who testifies against Dmetri at the trial,
the tortured intellectual brother, Ivan, who is actually responsible for the parricide
but hardly mentioned in Fetyukovich’s closing argument; and the prokurator Ivan
Kirillovich, who deeply resents the defendant’s attractiveness to the village’s women
and specifically to his own wife! DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 2, at 920, 956.
41
Id. at 938.
40
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Someone can be fighting and then compliant. Nobody
knows it better. But reasonable police officers continue
to assess and reevaluate. This is the critical decisionmaking policy or model. You gather information, you
assess the threat versus the risk. Do we have an
authority to act? What are our goals and actions?
Review and assess. Start over. Because this is not a
singular cycle. This is a cycle that as humans we
literally make millions of decisions in a day, right? Do
I go this way? Do I go that way? Do I go up? Do I go
down? We are constantly doing this. This is just human
behavior. But in the policing context, you have to
gather the information, assess the risk, assess the threat.
Do I have authority to act? What are my goals and
actions? Review and assess and it’s constantly rotating.
At the precise moment that Mr. Floyd was laid on the
ground, a reasonable police officer would know about
those previous 17 minutes.42
The job of defense counsel is to distract, mislead, and conjecture as
broadly as she wishes. Dostoevsky was perhaps the first novelist to
stress this—not casually but at very great length towards the end of his
final masterpiece—and the experience of (in)famous 20th and 21st
century American trials bears it out. Facts are deliberately jettisoned,
or if necessary, kept on board but submerged in a welter of conflicting
speculations. It seems to be of no consequence in such a system
whether the defendant is innocent or guilty. Fetyukovich should have
and could have eviscerated the prokurator’s reconstruction of the crime
by forthrightly examining his opponent’s ratiocination, but he chose
confusion and chaos. The same choice is made by Nelson (and the
O.J. “Dream Team”), perhaps with better reason, since they are
arguing inferences that point to “not guilty” verdicts, knowing to a
virtual certainty that these men are guilty. It’s all smoke and mirrors.
It is how we play the game, especially given the constitutional
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. But does the game
lack epistemological soundness, ethical authenticity, or moral force?
In Bob’s terms, what faulty narratives undergird such a nomos, and
how should they be changed? This is our system of “justice,” but there

42

Chauvin Def. Closing Argument, supra note 3.
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are other nomoi that Robert Cover preferred and that are suggested as
The Brothers proceeds.
C.

Theorize Fact-Denial: Have the Jury Adopt
Indeterminacy as its Approach to Reality

I have already noted here that Robert Cover had little interest
and no faith in the part of the field he attacks from time to time, namely
the Law as Literature (or “the interpretive turn” to continental or local
theories of meaning) during the early 1980’s.43 One could say that
during this exact span of years, he wanted from the continent
Dostoevsky and not Derrida, and from the U.S. experience Melville’s
Whale and not Stanley Fish, Billy Budd, Sailor, and not American
reader response theories. The second and third strategies deployed by
Fetyukovich and Eric Nelson further delineate the perils of “theory”
once unbound, however brilliantly, from text. 44 They also lead to this
paper’s coda: Law, Religion, and Cover’s Jewishness.45
The ultimate risk of theorizing reality or texts is that in
Fetyukovich’s case (but not in Nelson’s), you might actually hit upon
the truth, yet couch it as a falsehood, a Nietzschean “overturning of the
table of values”46 that no legal system should permit, much less be
based on.47 So in the way we might say “even a broken clock is right
twice a day,” Fetyukovich offers to the jury what really happened in
the earlier part of the story as a mere hypothetical that they can take or
leave as they wish. In the Chauvin case, Nelson’s interpretation of his
client’s keeping his leg on the victim’s neck for nine minutes and
twenty-nine seconds similarly hypothesizes a “reality” drawn from a
range of possibilities, but designed to distract the jury: both lawyers
believe they are falsifying in order to “avoid central realities”48
43

See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
See Richard Weisberg, Text into Theory: A Literary Approach to the Constitution,
20 GA. L. REV. 939, 945-46 (1986), reprinted in Richard Weisberg, On the Use and
Abuse of Nietzsche for Modern Constitutional Theory, in INTERPRETING LAW AND
LITERATURE: A HERMENEUTIC READER 181 (Sanford Levinson et al. eds., 1998).
45
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(somewhat like a novelist?49). In Book XII, Chapter 12, Fetyukovich
says:
I know the defendant: the wild, wooden heartlessness
that is laid by the prosecution at his door is not in
keeping with his character. He would have killed
himself, that is certain; he did not kill himself for the
specific reason that “his mother prayed for him”, and
his heart was innocent of the blood of his father. He
suffered torments, he grieved that night in Mokroye
[the inn where he is falsely “shown” to have wildly
spent 3000 rubles taken, but in reality not by him!, from
his dead father’s bedside] only for the old man Grigory
whom he had cast down and prayed inwardly to God
that the old man would arise and regain consciousness,
that his blow had not been fatal and that retribution for
it would not come to him. Why not accept such an
interpretation of events? What firm proof do we have
that the defendant is lying to us? Well, there is the
father’s corpse, it will be indicated to us once again: he
ran outside, he committed no murder—well, who was
it, then, murdered the old man?
I repeat, here is all the logic of the prosecution, who
could have committed the murder, if not he? “There is
no one,” it says, “whom we may put in his place.”
Gentlemen of the jury, is that really so? Is there really
and truly no one at all whom we may put in his place?
We heard the prosecution count on its fingers all who
were in that house or who visited it that night. There
49

THE FAILURE OF THE WORD, supra note 13. Here, as I mentioned during the
discussion period of this Conference, Robert Cover’s own distinction between the
interpretation of stories and the interpretation, say, of the Constitution, see, e.g., infra
Appendix, Illustration 5, stresses the real risk of violence in performing the latter
erroneously compared to the relative innocuousness of mis-reading, say, a poem or
novel. Here, at least, as I tried to show him during our conversations (albeit
unsuccessfully), I believe his distinction is invalid: error is error, and the injustice
caused by some stories and the way they are understood (e.g. The New Testament
and Hamlet) unleashes at least as much violence into the world as do all but the most
egregious mis-readings of the Constitution. What I think we agreed on was stories
like The Brothers or Billy Budd, Sailor reveal both the risks of distortion in law and
the possibility of avoiding legal interpretive violence by finding the just solution to
a given textual problem.
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were five people. Three of them, I agree, are completely
excluded for obvious reasons: they are the murdered
man himself, the old man Grigory, and his wife. There
remain, consequently, the defendant and Smerdyakov,
and now the prosecutor exclaims with enthusiasm that
the defendant has identified Smerdyakov as the
murderer because there is no one else whom he may so
identify, that were there some sixth person, or even the
ghost of some sixth person, the defendant would
immediately, in shame, stop accusing Smerdyakov, and
point to the sixth person instead. . . . [Now, not for the
first time, Fetyukovich appears avant la letter as Donald
Trump, anticipating the latter’s use of social media
gossip to create realities]. Yes, to be sure, the only
people who point to Smerdyakov are the defendant, his
two brothers and Svetlova, and they would appear to be
the only ones. But in fact, there are also others: there is
a certain, though obscure ferment in the social circles
of this town with regard to a question, a suspicion, there
is in circulation a kind of obscure rumor, there is a
feeling that something may be expected to come to
light. There is, finally, the testimony of a certain
juxtaposition of facts, one thoroughly characteristic,
thought, I admit, also ill-defined: in the first place, this
fit of the falling sickness on the very day of the
catastrophe, a fit which the prosecutor was for some
reason so painstakingly compelled to defend and
vindicate. Then this sudden suicide of Smerdyakov on
the eve of the trial.50
In the closing argument for the defense in the George Floyd trial, Eric
Nelson stated:
We have all these different opinions in terms of the use
of force. We have all of the opinions of Seth Stoughton,
Jody Steiger, Barry Broad, Zimmerman, Arradondo,
David Ploeger, Lieutenant Mercil, and they all reach
very different conclusions about when the force became
unreasonable. All you have to know about Barry Broad
50

DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 2, at 940-41.
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is what he was talking about. Is this physically
managing any person? His opinion was you can use
non-deadly force to physically manage a person. It’s all
within the model of the MPD decision-making model.
I found the most interesting person to be relevant to the
use of force Lieutenant Johnny Mercil, considering that
he is Derek Chauvin’s actual use of force trainer. So the
best glimpse that we’re going to get into the training of
a Minneapolis police officer comes from the trainer
who conducts the trainings. He’s conducted hundreds
of trainings over the years. He corrected the state at
certain times in terms of how strike charts don’t apply
to restraint techniques. He said the knee on the neck is
not an unauthorized move and it can be utilized in
certain circumstances.
He describes using a knee on the neck and back and
stated that it can be there for an extended period of time,
depending on the level of resistance you get. He said
that once the suspect is handcuffed, it does not
necessarily mean that it is time to move your leg
because when people are handcuffed, they can thrash
around and continue to be dangerous to themselves and
others. He talked about the ground defense program
because it’s safer for both the suspect and the officer.
He talked about ground defense as a form of using your
weight to control a subject, and therefore replacing the
need to punch your [inaudible]. He said there is no strict
techniques [sic]. You need to be fluid and adapt to the
circumstances, that he personally trains officers to put
a knee over the shoulder, up to the base of the neck, and
he described this maneuver as routinely trained by the
Minneapolis Police Department.
He testified that there are circumstances that an officer
would need to use his weight to continue to control a
subject. He recognized the concept of awful, but lawful.
Sometimes the use of force is just not that attractive.
He’s experienced himself, arresting people who have
claimed to had [sic] a medical emergency. He explained
how one way people can resist is through their words.
He described how someone resisting can become
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passive and then become resistant again and vice versa.
He discussed how officers are trained, not just to focus
on the subject, but also the bystanders. He trains
officers that if you’re fighting with a suspect and that
person then becomes compliant, it is a legitimate
consideration for the continued use of force to control a
subject, that if a subject overpowers more than one
officer at a time, that is a legitimate consideration in the
continuation of the use of force.
He talked about substance abuse and how that [sic]
officers are trained. I understand that superhuman
strength is not a real phenomenon. I know there are no
Superman or Spiderman. But officers are specifically
trained that someone under the influence of certain
types of controlled substances exhibit this behavior.
They become stronger than they normally would.
We’ve all heard the anecdotal stories of the pregnant
mom lifting the car off someone. It’s not literally
describing a superhero. It’s simply describing that
someone is exhibiting a greater strength. And the
Minneapolis Police Department specifically trains
that.51
For Dmitri Karamazov, Fetyukovich counsels the jury to pick
out an interpretation among several that might be offered of who
committed the parricide. 52 But Robert Cover, if arguing this case,
would have insisted to the jury that the facts lead only to Dmitri’s
innocence. He would not have offered the jury the out provided by
Fetyukovich’s slippery indeterminacy.
Hard work debunks
prosecutorial error. Fetyukovich prefers to speculate, and his tone, like
Eric Nelson’s, convinces no one on the jury.
Nelson for his part, not only asks the jury to accept the
interpretation of events offered by one witness—Johnny Mercil—but
appeals to them through stories, such as “Spiderman” and “Superman,”
to nudge them to the image of a suddenly revivified George Floyd
leaping from the dead and attacking Chauvin. 53 Perversely, Chauvin
becomes the (potential) victim. Equally perversely, Dmitri becomes
51
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the innocent defendant, not in fact (although he is), but through his
counsel’s sustained argument that there is no innocence or guilt
anyway, no graspable reality that is worth seizing and valuing. These
suggestions to the jury of indeterminate interpretive theories of
meaning are taken to their logical conclusion in both trials (and in OJ?),
as the defense lawyers explicitly become nihilists.
D.

Tell the Jury: “Forget Everything You Ever
Learned or Have Seen With Your Own Eyes and
Join Me on the Path to Philosophical Nihilism”
(Fetyukovich Erases the Parricide; Eric Nelson
Creates an Enraged Crowd Descending
Menacingly on his Client During the Nine and a
Half Minutes)

Wolfgang Holdheim,54 the first to write brilliantly about
judicial error in great novels, and especially in The Brothers,55 and
whose work has been elegantly translated into English by Marguerite
DeHuszar Allen,56 says the following of Fetyukovich’s arguments in
chapters entitled “A Stick With Two Ends,” “There Was No Money.
There Was No Robbery,” and “Nor Was There Even Any Murder:”
Still more profound and consequential is Fetyukovich’s
critique wherein the thinking intellect undermines
itself. . . . [I]f even the single fact is questionable, then
how do things stand with the chain of facts? It doesn’t
stand at all, it’s always only interpretation, only
perspectival selection out of the chain of reality.
Fetyukovich’s explanations remind us here of nothing
less than David Hume’s critique of the concept of
causality! As far as psychology is concerned, it is (as
the examining magistrate, Porfiry in CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT already knows) a double-edged sword:
Fetyukovich used the famous metaphor of a stick with
two ends, according to which it only depends on how
one serves himself. That is no longer romantic
subjectivity, such as Dmitri’s, it is universal relativism,
54
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doubt about the possibility of knowledge/knowing.
Every decision/conclusion is individual speculation,
which basically can be replaced by another ‘x’. Here is
the explanation for why the defense attorney plays with
all possibilities. That’s why he grazes the truth without
stopping. . . . He has no truth to offer, he says, nothing
is true—or perhaps he asks with Pontius Pilate, what is
truth?57
Professor Holdheim’s brilliant analysis dates from 1969, way before
deconstructionism’s influence on law, for example, had reached full
bore.58 But as a distinguished literature professor at Cornell, he saw
what was coming. And I think Robert Cover at that early stage might
have had some misgivings, which probably grew over time. Law and
Literature can be seen in full both as a response to outright nihilism in
legal and literary theory and as an appeal to accept the factual basis of
an event and the soundness of an interpretive theory or process of
ratiocination that tends to grasp and articulate knowable realities.59 It
is here, I believe, that Robert Cover found his self-expressed
“brotherhood” within the movement. 60 This is no Critical Legal
Studies, nor is this a temporary infusion of continental thought
(including bad mis-readings of that non-nihilist Nietzsche!). No, this
is neither because the brothers and sisters of Law and Literature, like
Robert Cover, believe in facts and trust that once those facts are
ascertained by sound interpreters (and not interfered with by
questionable nomoi), those facts will lead to justice.61 And it is in his
own adherence to facts that Cover’s fascination with The Brothers lies,
as well as in the religious perspective he would have brought to the
novel. Cover was no “Pontius Pilate” nor was he a grand inquisitor;
rather, he was a deeply thoughtful Jew.
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See generally Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: The “Mystical Foundation of
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Nihilism becomes explicit as, again, we place Fetyukovich’s
arguments next to Chauvin’s. In Book XII, Chapter 13, Fetyukovich
says:
Yes, it is a terrible thing to spill the blood of a father—
the blood of the one who begot me, the blood of the one
who has loved me, the blood of the one who has not
spared himself for me, the one who has ached with my
illnesses ever since I was a child, the one who has
suffered all his life for my happiness and has lived only
for my joys, my successes! Oh, to kill such a father—
why, that is impossible even to think! Gentlemen of the
jury, what is a father, a real father, what great word is
this, what terrifyingly great idea lies in this
designation? We have just indicated in part what a true
father is and should be. But in the case before us now,
the one with which we are so occupied, with which our
souls ache—in the case before us the father, the
deceased Fyodor Pavlovich Karamazov, in no way
fitted that conception of a father which impressed our
hearts just now. That is a misfortune. Yes, indeed,
certain fathers resemble a misfortune. But let us
examine this misfortune more closely—after all, we
must fear nothing, gentlemen of the jury, in view of the
importance of the decision we are about to make. We
must especially fear nothing now and, as it were, wave
certain ideas away, like children or like women easily
frightened, to employ the highly talented prosecutor’s
happy expression. But in his impassioned speech my
respected adversary (an adversary even before I had
uttered my first word), my adversary several times
exclaimed: “No, I will not let anyone else defend the
accused, I will not leave his defence to the highly
talented counsel who has arrived from St. Petersburg—
I am both prosecutor and counsel for the defence!”
Thus did he several times exclaim, forgetting, however,
to mention that if the fearsome defendant had for an
entire twenty-three years been so grateful for a mere
pound of nuts received from the only person who had
shown him some affection as a child within the home
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of his progenitor, then, vice versa, such a man would
not, would he, be able to forget, all those twenty-three
years, that he had run about barefoot at his father’s
house “in the backyard without any boots on and with
his little trousers held up by a single button . . .” in the
expression of the philanthropic [witness, Dr.]
Herzenstube. . . . What greeted my client when he
arrived there at his father’s house? And why, why
depict my client as unfeeling, an egoist, a monster? He
is unrestrained, he is wild and violent, that is why we
are trying him now, but who is to blame for his fate,
who is to blame that with good inclinations, with a
noble, feeling heart he received such a preposterous
upbringing? Did anyone instruct him in sweet reason,
was he educated in science and study, did anyone love
him even just a little when he was a child? . . . Let us,
also, not bring ruin to a human soul! I asked just now
the question: what is a father, and exclaimed that this is
a great word, a precious designation. But with the word,
gentlemen of the jury, one must treat honourably, and I
shall permit myself to name an object by its proper
word, its proper designation: a father such as the
murdered old man Karamazov cannot and is not worthy
to be called a father. . . . [W]e are not fathers but foes
unto our children, and they are not our children, but our
foes, and we ourselves have made them thus! . . . Nay,
let us prove, on the contrary, that the progress of recent
years has also touched our moral development, and let
us say outright: a begetter is not yet a father, while a
father is a begetter and a deserver. . . . How then may it
be decided? Like this: let the son stand before his father
and ask him in good sense: “Father, tell me: why must
I love you? Father, prove to me that I must love you!”
. . . [I]f the father is unable to offer proof—then at once
an end to this family: he is no father to him, and the son
receives his freedom and the right henceforth to
consider his father as one alien to him and even as his
foe. . . . “Gentlemen of the jury, you recall that dreadful
night, of which so much has already been said today,
when a son, by climbing a fence, penetrated into the
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house of his father and stood, at last, face to face with
the one who begot him, his foe and wronger. With all
my might I insist—not for money did he come running
at that moment: the accusation of robbery is
preposterous, as I have already explained. And not to
murder him, oh no, did he force his way into his house
. . . but assume that it were so, so let it be, and let us
suppose it for a single moment! . . . But the father, the
father—oh, all was done by the mere sight of the father,
his hater since childhood, his foe, his wronger, and
now—his monstrous rival! A sense of hatred seized
hold of him involuntarily, uncontainably, and reasoning
was impossible . . . . A murder of that kind is not a
murder. Neither is a murder of that kind a parricide.
No, the murder of a father such as that cannot be called
a parricide. A murder of that kind may be classed as a
parricide only out of prejudice! . . . But do you wish to
punish him terribly, ferociously, with the most dreadful
punishment that one may imagine, but with the purpose
of saving and regenerating his soul forever? If so, then
crush him with your mercy!62
Fetyukovich, before this jury of ordinary Russian folks, has just
lost his case! Carried away by his nihilistic ramblings, he posits a
world with no anchoring in facts or in justice. And Eric Nelson again
becomes a 21st century Fetyukovich when he denies, not so much the
existence of a murder, but the equally palpable fact of a quiescent
crowd in the vicinity of his client as he was killing George Floyd, a
crowd he transmutes—with the help of an explicit philosophy of
nihilism—before the amazed jury. In the closing argument for the
defense in the George Floyd trial, Eric Nelson stated:
And before I really kind of start talking about the crowd
in some limited detail, I have thought a lot during the
course of this trial about the difference between
perspective and perception. Perspective and perception
are two distinct concepts. Perspective is the angle at
which you see something. It’s your perspective.
Perception is how you interpret what it is that you see.
62
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I’ve thought about this a lot during the course of this
trial, because this situation here in the courtroom is
incredibly unique. Right? It’s not the normal setup for
a jury trial. My perspective through the course of this
trial, sitting in this chair, is that I cannot see four of the
jurors. Very limited opportunity to observe the jurors.
They probably can’t see me either. Several of the jurors,
I have a very good view of. Four of the jurors I don’t,
and obstructed views of others. My perspective sitting
in this chair when witnesses [testify], there’s a camera
blocking the head. In order for me to see the witness, I
have to roll all the way over to the other side. Then I
have to look through the plexiglass that has these large
reflecting lights. Right? Things block your perspective.
Things can affect your perspective. But your perception
is how you interpret what it is you see, and what it is
you experience. And that is our life, right? This is our
experiences [sic]. These are the things that make us who
we are. . . . Let’s look at this incident on May 25th from
the perspectives and perceptions of simply just four of
the bystanders. Right? . . . Genevieve Hanson. Right?
27-year-old female firefighter for the city of
Minneapolis. She testified that when she walked into
the scene, she described the crowd as upset. She said,
“I walked into an upset crowd.” She said that, “The
other voices distracted me from getting the officer’s
attention.” And she testified, again, based on her
perspective that Officer Chauvin appeared to have his
hand in his pocket. She observed what she believed to
be blood from Mr. Floyd’s face being pressed into the
pavement. She observed fluid coming from Mr. Floyd’s
body that she presumed to be urine. She testified that
nobody ever told her that EMS or an ambulance was on
the way. . . . But when you look at the things that Ms.
Hanson saw, whether it be from her perspective or her
perception, there can always be more to the story. The
blood coming from Mr. Floyd’s nose was why they
called EMS in the first place. You’ve seen the
pictures[!]. He injured his nose during the struggle, or
his face, during the struggle in the squad car. The fluid
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that she described as potentially being urine, we know
that that’s fluid coming from the underside carriage of
the squad car. . . . Genevieve Hanson has a perspective
and a perception and what she observed was not
consistent with the actual evidence. But remember, we
don’t look at this incident from the perspective of a
bystander. We do not look at this incident from the
perspective of the people who were upset by it. We look
at it from the perspective of a reasonable police officer.
A reasonable police officer, when confronted with these
bystanders would know everything that had occurred
up to that point. 20 minutes. 25 minutes. 30 minutes.
They know all of that information. The bystanders do
not. . . . Right? Reasonable police officers . . . would
know if citizens take out their cell phones and start
filming. This is the point, at 8:20 and 49 seconds, when
Ms. Frazier starts recording. Reasonable police officers
are aware when they’re using force that sometimes
what they’re doing does not look good to the general
public. A reasonable police officer will hear the
frustration growing. Right? A reasonable police officer
will hear the increase in the volume of the voices. A
reasonable police officer will hear the name calling.
Right? Chump, whatever names are being called.
They’ll hear the cursing there. They’ll hear this, and
they’ll take that into their consideration. . . . You can
see Officer Chauvin’s body language tells us a lot.
Right? That’s what we just heard. Looking down,
looking up, looking around, looking down, looking
over, looking around. He’s comparing a reasonable
police officer. He’s doing what a reasonable police
officer would do. He’s comparing his actions, his own
actions, in response to what the crowd is saying. A
reasonable police officer, again, will rely on his
training. 2020. March of 2020. Tactics of a crowd.
Never underestimate a crowd’s potential. Most crowds
are compliant. Crowds are very dynamic creatures and
can change rapidly. A crowd may contain elements of
several types of groups. Now I acknowledged that this
is in dealing with massive crowds, protests and things
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of that nature. These are the tactics, but you never
underestimate a crowd’s potential because a reasonable
police officer has to be aware and alert to his
surroundings. A reasonable police officer will consider
his department’s policy on crisis. . . . A reasonable
police officer is recognizing that the crowd is in crisis.
That all of these things, the members, the bystanders,
the citizens, whatever you want to call them, they are in
crisis. . . . What are these potential signs of aggression
that I may be confronted with? Somebody standing tall,
somebody red in their face, raised voice, heavy
breathing, tense muscles, pacing. Right? . . . How do
you respond to those? You’re confident in your actions.
You stay calm. You maintain space. You speak slowly
and softly and you avoid staring and eye contact. Again,
these are things that [witness] Ker Yang discussed in
terms of how to deal with a crisis. As this crowd grew
more and more upset, or deeper into crisis, a very
critical thing happens, at a very precise moment. I
cannot, in my opinion, understate the importance of this
moment. The critical moment in this case, if you recall
from Dr. Tobin’s testimony, and nobody disagreed, that
Mr. Floyd took his last breath at 8:25:16. 8:25:16. What
is happening at the very precise moment that Mr. Floyd
takes his last breath? You’re taking one piece of
evidence and you’re comparing it against the rest. This
moment, 8:25:16, as Mr. Floyd is taking his last breath
. . . . Three things happen. Mr. Floyd takes his last
breath. You see Officer Chauvin’s reaction to the crowd
is to pull his mace and shake it. He’s threatening the use
of force, as is permitted by the Minneapolis Police
Department policy, and Genevieve Hanson walks in at
that time from behind him. Startling him. All of these
facts and circumstances simultaneously occur at a
critical moment. And that changed Officer Chauvin’s
perception of what was happening. 63
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ROBERT COVER’S JEWISHNESS

Bob’s Jewishness and his reading of novels like the ones he and
I discussed so often led him to see that standard jurisprudence and
black letter criminal law and procedure provided only an incomplete
normative portrait of law’s true potential to do justice. It is in the
novels that so captivated Bob that a better vision of law comes forward.
Dostoevsky left for future generations a kind of time capsule in which
two conclusions might be drawn: (1) Western law in the 19th and 20th
(and 21st, had Bob lived to see it so far) centuries are as grotesque in
their approaches to criminal justice as lawyers in those centuries would
have described trial by fire, trial by water, and—if some of them were
not arguing for it themselves 64—torture; and (2) there are better
methods—sounder pathways to a just resolution of legal struggles—
and these begin with considering the narratives that undergird the law,
and particularly, which religious narratives.
A.

Law, Religion, and Robert Cover’s Jewish Roots:
Some Fault-Lines Jewish Nomoi Tend to Avoid,
and Some Extensions of Them to a Just Outcome in
Law Often Unavailable to Christian-Rooted Words
and Arguments
1.Five Errors in “The Brothers” Attributable
to Fantastical Thinking

Like most readers of the full novel, Bob and I talked a lot about
“The Grand Inquisitor,” the thought experiment proposed by the
tortured intellectual, Ivan Karamazov, to his younger brother,
Alyosha.65 The parable recounts a return to earth by Jesus, who is
64

For arguments in favor of torture, see Alan Dershowitz, Tortured Reasoning, in
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confronted by the religion he created and especially by the religion’s
highest authority. It is not a pretty picture, and it foreshadows the far
longer procedure this paper has focused on.66 Although deeply
religious himself, Dostoevsky offers us only a degraded
representation—through the intellectual atheist Karamazov brother,
Ivan—of Christian law and authority as it has developed over eighteen
centuries.67 Essential to developments inculcated by the Grand
Inquisitor are: (1) programmatically misreading facts; (2) ironically
adopting methods of punishment harsher than regimes not predicated
on Christian “love” and “mercy”; (3) torturing the innocent through
inquisitorial methods unimaginable to Christianity’s founder; (4)
failing to provide a “narrative” that might soften the effect of law, i.e.
outdoing supposed Jewish “legalism”; and (5) losing sight of the
“paideic” nature of nomos.68
The Grand Inquisitor’s five points pre-figure, in the novel, the
secular application of the sad Christian narrative to the nomos this
paper has been discussing through the figure of Fetyukovich. Bob’s
interest in The Brothers surely related primarily to the linkage of law
and religion that most significant Law and Literature stories forge.
Remarkably, he precisely describes both the specific development
represented by “The Grand Inquisitor” and, much more broadly, the
effect on nomos of what he calls the “subversive force . . . of a
revolutionary [allegory].”69 In the crucial paragraphs surrounding his
only reference in that essay to The Brothers, Bob describes the taking
over of Jewish norms and values by the revolutionary underminer par
excellence, Paul:
[T]he sacred beginning [say of Judaism] always
provides the typology for a dangerous return. . . . So it
was that Paul could put the [Jewish] narratives to the
service of a revolutionary allegorical extension of the
typology in his Epistle to the Galatians. There the Jews
with their law are compared to Hagar and Ishmael, the
firstcomers, whose claim is based on law. The new
Christian Church is Sarah and Isaac, the later comers,
66

Id. The parable, which–prior to Law and Literature treatments of the novel is far
better known to the critical and general reader–is 23 pages long, compared to the
legal process’ 388 pages!
67
See THE FAILURE OF THE WORD, supra note 13, at 65-70.
68
See COVER, supra note 2, for all five points expressed.
69
Id. at 119.
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who lack any legal entitlement but who hold the divine
promise of destiny. The whole edifice of law is thus
torn down through an allegory upon the pervasive
narrative motif . . . . It is particularly powerful to use in
the critique of the law of Israel an allegory built on the
theme that itself expresses the extralegality [sic] of
Israel’s destiny.70
Had Robert Cover seen the fullness of days—at least the threescore
and ten promised in the Bible71—I am positive he would have written
more on The Brothers. His insight placed near his evocative footnote
mentioning the latter in his best-known essay opens up not only “The
Grand Inquisitor” but also the problematic practice of law on earth by
the Christian Inquisitor’s secular colleagues, represented by
Fetyukovich and Eric Nelson (and the O.J. “Dream Team”). The
existing Jewish nomos, undergirded, when Jesus walked the earth, by
centuries of complex and enlightened narrative and epitomized by
what Nietzsche—writing exactly what Bob is writing decades
earlier—calls “the Jewish ‘Old Testament,’ the book of divine
justice”72—is torn down by the singular revolutionary figure of Paul,
who grotesquely utilizes that divine book to construct an edifice built
on its opposite and to destroy law.
2.St. Paul’s Deliberately Erroneous “Defense”
of Jesus
As Bob well understood, part of Paul’s subversive program
involved a “typological” approach to the Tanakh, where A becomes B
and meanings are deliberately distorted on behalf of a Revolutionary
program that requires such distortions as a hermeneutic necessity, 73
and in which the great Hebrew prophets (especially Isaiah) are made
to announce the coming of Jesus, who also situates himself above the
entire narrative, waiting both to appear and then to return. The method
of transmuting A to B by now is familiar to the reader of this paper in
a secular context of Law and Literature.
70

Id. at 118-20.
Psalm 90:10 (referring to the biblical measure of days, threescore and ten).
72
See FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL 59-60 (Marianne Cowan
trans., 1966) (1886).
73
See RICHARD H. WEISBERG, IN PRAISE OF INTRANSIGENCE: THE PERILS OF
FLEXIBILITY 56-85 (2014).
71
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Elsewhere in Nomos and Narrative, Bob endeavored to explain
what Dostoevsky shows might have been available to a Christian
interpreter like Fetyukovich (finding the correct outcome in Dmitri’s
case) but is undermined by the hermeneutic methodology of Christ’s
emissary on earth, the Grand Inquisitor, who falsifies reality in
(literally) the face of his jury of one, Jesus himself. I believe Bob
realized that the toughest task he had set himself was to explain,
precisely, the sound interpretive approach of the Jewish tradition
compared to its undermining by the revolutionary Paul. This was
Bob’s greatest challenge. Without his mix of traditional Jewish
learning and strong secular brilliance, getting this across to an audience
of constitutional scholars seems impossible. But only a few pages
prior to the citation to The Brothers I have just invoked, Cover gives it
one of his best tries when he discusses the great 16th century Talmudic
scholar, Joseph Karo:
Karo’s commentary and the aphorisms that are its
subject suggest two corresponding ideal-typical
patterns of combining corpus, discourse, and
interpersonal commitment to form a nomos. The first
such pattern, which according to Karo is worldcreating, I shall call “paideic,” because the term
suggests: (1) a common body of precept and narrative,
(2) a common and personal way of becoming educated
into this corpus, and (3) a sense of direction or growth
that is constituted as the individual and his community
work out the implications of their law. Law as Torah is
pedagogic. It requires both the discipline of study and
the projection onto the future that is interpretation. 74
IV. CONCLUSION
Soundness in our legal system requires a return to models
available in Jewish thought over three millennia, or so Robert Cover
believed. In representing at great length a secular trial that results in
error, Dostoevsky, as a Christian writer, recognized the built-in
potential for injustice in his own religion that the story’s “The Grand
Inquisitor” represents fully. The defense’s argument in the Chauvin
74

COVER, supra note 2, at 105-06. For more on this passage in Cover, see Weisberg,
supra note 35, at 791.
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trial of 2021 (and in the O.J. Simpson trial of 1988) negate in an
American context the precept that Bob—in my view—carried in his
head and heart every day: “Justice, justice, shall ye seek.”

1974

TOURO LAW REVIEW
APPENDIX
Illustration 1

Vol. 37

2022

ROBERT COVER’S LOVE OF STORIES

Illustration 2

A

I

1

2

-=-

12

Sl=a
S1= a

O

-=-

3-=-

2-=~--=-

A

41

-,=a

-

cL.- -.... t-s~ - 'ff,. \C.-.....i:..
$
-

I

~ » t ,o.,..

ewv'1
:...-=-

1975

1976

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 37

Illustration 3
JUNE 13
.MONDAY
"'
SUNDAY JUNE 19

Mondav Jsl8 13 -

~.AIMIO

JuNdOy).Jnt,14-

, c::a ,
2
3

-

•
6

c:::a • ,-:
c:::a 10 \°
c::a
-==a

,.

l

12
~Jl.fle18-

!...)

J

\

Sllldoy .AM'lG 19 · -

2022

ROBERT COVER’S LOVE OF STORIES
Illustration 4

. ,.:·. . II
,·µ;:

l 'i8f.

··-

-

..... u

' '\1j A '\

JULY 14

..
I

~•gG
·--\}{.:.
'

=s::::a
:;::a
s;;:::ir

,a.

•
~

1977

(vtJrlNC

,....,...... .,

- - -Q

..

.. JULY 20

'

I

.-

·-

~

- ...
M.,. .

t

,------

•

II

II

•

u

, I
II

•.~i,(r~- avu,,

II
.
~.

T~ ..

1978

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 37

Illustration 5
GEORGIA U W REVIEW

116

ARTIC LES

THE BONDS OF CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION: OF THE WORD,
TH£ 0 ££0 , ANO THE ROLE
/lobt,r M, Co.,.,.

In these: remarks l ihall 1ake WUC whh the theme aoundtd by
u a.tCM1a1

ft"cral o ther Kholl.rt In thlt Symposium-tlt.at there h

unity to the lntcrprcdvc work of law and litcnilurc. Indeed, I lhall
take l.h"uc wich one or the priadpaJ prcrm(S or 11'1c Symp,osNM
llkl f-that l1w is on.e or thc UbcRJ '"'·
At n11o1 blush 1hlt may ICffll ,urprlslQS. rven «>Mradkto,y. Sinot
I bq&n 1cachln1 aJmou. two ckcadc:a qo, I hlWI b«:a COnc'CfflCd
with lhc convcr,:c:nc:c or law and Utc:ralurc. While m,)' autnUOQ 10
the lhtmci Ui ndthcr tJ pcnl.-cnt nor M <1«0 In m,y ~ o;f
the humanhltt II thll of my brothtn Whhe, WtlJbcr& and Ball,
I am stlll 001 ..,,1,t.,w,c1 10 be tountlll In Ille fold or 111c 11w
and humanltla Ooc.k.
My dlllC'RI, Ihm, con«ml~ lht dalm ol "unity" of tlw In•
1crptttlve and narrative 11tldt-fflY dlmot from lbe prun}tt tMil
law lt amon1 tho "hwnan.lda"-1.a a dtAp'fflne'nt lfflOftl rntocb
cn,patd hi what b, Ir not a oommon eritcrPfflC, 11 ._. a ICrit$
or cntcrpri1e1 wtth many com.mon.alilics.
Indeed, I dare NY 50me of the dbdnctioos I w.11 cmphub:ie
bt1wttn conuluulonaJ lnterprdlllon llftd Olhcr fnttrpmlvt u'ldldon, are dlt,dncdom to whkh Olhcri havt al ku1 alluded. I am
conridtnt that most Ir not all lhe partidpanll ID lhk S)'fflposium

(Vol. 20:815

wOldd c'OGC'tde UIIU. the diffemxa: exis-1. ~ quation it how much
10 mue of thtm..
la Ibis lecture: I tboolc 10 make or 1hcm a 1ru1 dt-31. In dolna
10, I do not wbb 10 be IIUAIDdcntood. I am not 1t11in1 1hat there
ls IIOCbln& I.bat wt, a.s t.:wym:. caa ldrn rrecn literature. Nor, or
cout1e, am I ltlcina that at torr.e wmdtNly hll,h level or 1bs1nc•
doo tbtre: b: • common c::atqoey to whk:h the praclice or law and
litfflturc both bdon.a- I am 11t1UO, • modest, bul 1 chink real,
point or disqrwmmt, and 11 can be 1ta1cd dmply: The: pr1tc11c!e
or C0111&luttloDIJ lmttprttatlon ls 10 lnuulcably bound up with the
real lbrac o.- pnctke or violent deed$ lbal h 11-tnd lhO\lld beu cucntlaUy diffarn1 cllidpliDC rtom ''ln1ap,eui1lon" ln lltc111ure
and lhr humanida.
We rm,bl bqla the proc:aa or d.btJrq,ubhlna lq,al and corull•
t11tlofta.l

lote,prculJon. from ochitt form• by nodn.a, Orst, a.n clcmcn1

1M& is llwan a.nd promiPcnOy pracn1 with raped 10 c:onsdtutlont
and '#tlldl nuy in race be Wrcd, 1bou&h In ku promlncn1 wa)'I,
bf litcnlurc &ad other lrtd.it.k>N. Thb prominent fcm urc of con•
Jlkudou wu ..occd oYU tony ycan qo by a 1/f~t lltcflry crick
wbo. Uk.e many today, aspired to • ,c.netal theory or dl.scoune lhll
would fflCOfflpatl law u wdl u llleraturt.
Kcmc1h Burke wrote, lo ISMS: ·•Coru11tu1k,n, are a,onlt1k In•
Jln.&Ntl,U, They bwot"' H e:nem)', itnpUd11)'
c11pUcilly." 1 Burko

°'

tunhff. He po,h«f that conschutlont not only ire qonl$1lc
buc that. 1bq atablish a normttivt world OA the blJis of their
oppotitiol\ 10 otbcr worlds. •'NortnAtlw workb" a,e my 1erm,.
Wffll

Brute•, wonk

.-c:

For wtw • ComtitLtt.lon would do prlma.rfly It 10 1111).
«MrioJ~ 011 '141,J,t (co buc: • 1tattmen1 as 10 w"'11 should
bt upoa a ttaccmc:nc u co what ls). And rn our "-ao,,
niltlc'' -id, IUCb IUllluntialioa dcrtva point and potan,n.
~ by contrut with aoclom u 10 what •bould not be-.'
Berte's point about lhe a,onbdc tlflMnt In COftllkudons b en•

drdy conslstm.t with • view of CONdtudon•I law u 1 "culture or

815

2022

ROBERT COVER’S LOVE OF STORIES
Illustration 6

1979

1980

TOURO LAW REVIEW
Illustration 7

Vol. 37

